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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2
v.
CaseNo.970485-CA

GARY LEE KINGSTON,
Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING AND BASIS OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his conviction of one count of conspiracy to commit
aggravated robbery, a second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4201 (1995) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995). Because of the degree of this
offense, this Court has original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(1996).
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Was the trial court's finding sufficient to allow into evidence the co-conspirator's
recitation of defendant's conversation about mace and a BB gun? This Court will not
disturb the trial court's admissibility ruling "unless it clearly appears that the lower
court was in error." State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313,1316 (Utah App. 1986) (discussing
admission of co-conspirator's statement under hearsay exception); State v. Chavez, 840
P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992) (same).
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RELEVANT PROVISION
Rule 801. Definitions
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is
subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the
statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication
or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after
perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A)
the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the
subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship,
or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Statement of Facts
Independent Evidence of Conspiracy
On January 27, 1997, Valerie Kim Strait went to visit a friend at the U.S. Ski
Team office in Park City, Utah (R. 202). Standing by the office and next to the
adjacent First Security Bank were two men, Michael Clay and the defendant, huddled
together smoking cigarettes and talking (R. 204). Ms. Strait noticed them because they
looked out of place, i.e., "[t]hey looked different than the person that you would see on
the street in Park City" (R. 211). Wearing brand new tennis shoes instead of ski boots
and multi-layered street clothes instead of ski apparel, the two gentleman stood out in
that cold, snowy Park City January (id.).
The next afternoon, making a delivery from her gift basket business, Ms. Strait
returned to the ski offices, where she again saw Mr. Clay and the defendant, wearing
the same clothes and standing in the same location as the day before (R. 206). This
time when she entered the ski office, she mentioned the duo to the personnel, who
eventually called the police (id.).
Officer Sherman Farnsworth responded to the call and, upon arriving, noticed
the defendant walk off at a fast pace upon seeing the police car (R. 221-22). Before
responding to the officer's call to stop, defendant had walked about fifty to seventy feet
away (id). Officer Farnsworth was struck by the multiple layers of clothing defendant
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was wearing and the disparate stories he heard from defendant and Mr. Clay about their
presence in Park City (R. 242-44). When asked why he was in Park City and how he
got there, defendant told the officer that he and Mr. Clay had hitchhiked up to see the
sights (R. 228). At the same time, Officer Farnsworth heard Mr. Clay tell a different
police officer that a friend had brought them to Park City to go skiing (id.). When the
officer interviewing Mr. Clay yelled out that he had found a weapon (a BB gun and a
can of mace), Officer Farnsworth handcuffed and arrested the defendant (R. 234-35).
At the police station, the officers had Mr. Clay and the defendant take off their
different layers of clothes: Mr. Clay had seven different layers of different types of
clothes; the defendant had on five different layers of different types of clothes (R. 234).
While at the Summit County Jail, defendant told two different inmates that he
intended to rob the First Security Bank or anyone coming out of that bank with a
bankroll (R. 265; 273). To Wesley Gillmor he specifically said that he and his partner
were waiting for someone to come out who they would then rob (R. 266). Craig
Coombs reported that defendant said he and Mr. Clay were "staking out the bank to rob
it" and "waiting to rob somebody going in or out" (R. 273). Defendant also told
Coombs that he had a 9 mm Baretta but had thrown it in the snowbank when he saw the
police (id).
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Co-conspirator Clay's Testimony1
Michael Clay originally met defendant in Elko, Nevada and they planned to meet
again in Salt Lake City (R. 292). Shortly after getting together again, defendant started
talking about how Park City was a prime target for crime because people there were
more naive than in a regular city (R. 296). Defendant told Clay how they could just sit
outside a bank and wait for the right person to come along with a bankroll so they
could rob him (R. 297). Defendant told Clay to wear several layers of clothing so they
could change their look after a robbery; he also persuaded him to take mace and a BB
gun, telling him that it was not illegal to carry such items (id.). According to Clay, on
the first day of their stake-out, they targeted one person, an elderly man who drove a
burgundy van, but defendant said to take note of the time he came to the bank and they
would get him the next day (R. 298).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly found that co-conspirator Clay's testimony was
supported by independent evidence of a conspiracy and that the statements he
recollected about weapons were made during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Consequently, all defendant's statements were admissible under the coconspirator hearsay exception.

Clay pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor attempted theft in exchange for truthful
testimony about defendant (R. 294).
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ARGUMENT
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT FOUND BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANT AND CLAY WERE INVOLVED IN A
CONSPIRACY, ALL CLAY'S CONVERSATIONS
WITH DEFENDANT THAT OCCURRED IN THE
COURSE AND IN FURTHERANCE OF THE
CONSPIRACY WERE ADMISSIBLE.
Defendant contends that the trial court's finding of a conspiracy was insufficient
to allow into evidence Clay's testimony about defendant's statements about mace and a
BB gun.2 In making this claim, however, defendant misinterprets rule 801(d)(2)(E),
Utah Rules of Evidence, and the case law that has interpreted it. A trial court finding
of independent evidence does not mandate a specific listing of statements that can be
included in the testimony. It requires only that the statement have been made in the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) makes admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule,
testimony of a co-conspirator of statements made "during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy." Utah R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (1997). To qualify for this hearsay
exception, the out-of-court statement must be offered against a party-opponent and
made by a co-conspirator of the party during the course of and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1318 (Utah 1986). Additionally, before
introducing the testimony, the State must also provide "evidence independent and
2

Brief of Defendant at 6.
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exclusive of the conspirator's hearsay statements themselves, showing the existence of a
criminal joint venture and the defendant's participation therein. ... [and also] the
declarant's membership in the criminal venture." In other words, the State here was
obligated to show other evidence that defendant was in a conspiracy with Clay. Id.
Defendant does not object to the trial court's overall finding of conspiracy, which was
made in response to his objection before Clay's testimony.3 He only claims that
because the finding did not specifically mention the weapons, Clay's statements about

The Court finds from the following evidence, both direct and
circumstantial evidence, the existence of the criminal conspiracy: The
loitering of the defendant and the coconspirator in front of the bank
over a two-day period, the defendant's flight at the appearance of a
police officer, the inconsistent stories of the defendant and the alleged
co-conspirator given separate handling by the police officers at the
scene, the presence of weapons on the person of the alleged
coconspirator, presence of multiple layers of clothing on both the
defendant and the alleged coconspirator to suggest not simply bundling
up for the cold, but some other purpose because of the extensive
layering that was done, and the fact that both seemed to be consistent in
their actions; and perhaps most convincingly, the defendant's statement
to two separate inmates that he and an alleged coconspirator had been
planning to rob the bank or someone carrying a bag of money from the
bank.
The Court believes that the force and effect of all of these
separate statements and other evidences that have been brought into this
case establish more likely than not that there was an existence of the
criminal conspiracy independently of any testimony of the conspirator
and that the threshold has therefore been met under Rule 801(dX2)(E)
to allow the testimony of the alleged conspirator.
(R. 291-92).
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the weapons were not included within the co-conspiracy exception and, consequently,
were inadmissible hearsay.4
Defendant cites no case for the proposition that a co-conspiracy finding must
specifically list the type of statements that can be admitted. The Gray court does not
support the proposed mandate. Once a conspiracy is found, the only limitation to the
statements that are admissible is that they be made in the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy. Gray, 111 P.2d at 1320 ("Once a criminal venture is established, it
cannot seriously be contended that the statements were not made during the course of
the criminal venture."). Similarly, this Court has ratified a trial court finding of coconspiracy that did not expressly list types of statements that could be admitted. State
v. Chavez, 840 P.2d 846, 848 (Utah App. 1992). There, this Court upheld a trial court
finding similar to the one defendant challenges.3 This Court allowed into evidence a
variety of statements, none of which were specifically mentioned in that trial court's
ruling, i.e., phone calls, use, possession, and delivery of cocaine. Id. at 848-50. All

"Such testimony [of weapons] was introduced without any independent or reliable
evidence that Mr. Kingson had any knowledge of the possession of those items by Clay." Brief of
Defendant at 7.
5

I specifically find that there was evidence independent and exclusive of
statements of these individuals. That there was a joint criminal
venture. That defendant participated in the joint criminal venture and
that there was membership by the declarant in the criminal venture.

Chavez, 840 P.2d at 848.
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those statements were "in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Utah R.
Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (1997).
Consequently, the sole issue here is whether Clay's recitations about defendant's
encouraging him to use mace and a BB gun was in the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. Defendant apparently concedes that the statements were made during the
course of the conspiracy. A brief review of relevant case law also establishes that these
statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Under the identical federal counterpart to the co-conspirator hearsay exception,
any conversation that prompts action is in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United
States v. Kendall, 665 F.2d 126, 133 (7* Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1021
(1982). Thus, the phone calls and evidence of transportation of cocaine in Chavez
"furthered" the conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Similarly, defendant's telling Clay to
take mace and a BB gun with him furthered their planned conspiracy. It was with those
weapons that the robbery was to be carried out (R. 297). The federal second circuit
court of appeals illuminates what "in furtherance" means by contrast. United States v.
Lang, 589 F.2d 92, 99-100 (2d. Cir. 1978) (telling an undercover agent to "be careful"
was not in furtherance of a conspiracy because such a statement would discourage it,
not move it along).
The statements Clay recollected were not of the sort rejected in Lang. Rather,
they prompted action that furthered the conspiracy like those in Kendall and Chavez.
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Consequently, they were properly admitted as part of the co-conspiracy exception to
hearsay.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLICATION NOT REQUESTED
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TAH ATTORNEY GEr>
UTAH
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Assistant Attorney General
Appellate Division
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